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With the loosening of the once-powerful grip of Freudian drive theory on psychoanalytic practice, we relationally-oriented analysts no longer believe that the causes of psychopathology reside exclusively within the self-contained psyches of our patients. Instead, convinced that psychological life emerges and is sustained within the infinitely complex, constantly evolving context of relationships, we have become increasingly concerned with the ethical dimension of those relationships. Our quest for authoritative, irreducible, transcendent explanations of behavior has been replaced by our penchant for exploring such complex and difficult-to-pin-down matters as what constitutes moral human relating. It is no wonder, then, that we turn to philosophers for guidance in framing our questions about ethics and for help in evaluating the answers we tentatively propose.
The writings of Donna Orange that reveal her profound understanding of continental philosophy have stimulated many of us to pursue these matters. Indeed, the articles in this issue confirm that what she has referred to as “the ethical turn” (2016, pp. 29–31) is transforming our field.
Our issue opens with penetrating examinations by Peter Shabad and by John Foehl of the ethics of giving and receiving. Shabad delves into relationships between parents and children, as well as those between analysts and patients, to demonstrate the complexities involved in generously making space for the vulnerable contributions of the Other. Foehl’s commentary on Shabad’s article involves his conceptualization of a “dialectic of asymmetries.” Both draw on the philosophical writings of Levinas and Ricoeur.
Lynne Jacobs explores the concept of dignity in human relationships from a psychoanalytic perspective informed by the philosophical writings of Peter Baumann, Martin Buber, Marcia Cavell, and Charles Taylor, among others. She distinguishes between dignity as an ethical stance and as a “felt sense.” Claiming that shame is the “prima