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I find that there are only a few specific points to which I wish to respond. What I primarily want to do is reemphasize some broad features of my orientation that will, I hope, indicate the general approach I would take. Let's begin with the specific points. First, perhaps I would have been clearer if instead of saying that we are “wired for transcendence” I had said “wired for transcending.” That is an idea that is consonant with most developmental models. Of course, I am more sympathetic with Henry Grayson's wider use of the concept and hope that reading Grayson's remarks will incline Elliot Jurist to be more sympathetic with its value.
Second, while Amber Haque is correct in noting that I question the general usefulness of any radical conceptual separation of religion and spirituality, I nonetheless recognize that, for some, this distinction is indeed helpful. For them, it is a way of saying that they feel a deep affinity with many of the experiences that have formed—and still form—a part of classical religious life, but nonetheless they don't find themselves willing to commit to a specific creed or set of religious practices. I only hope that they do find some organized way of moving from their spiritual experience to action in the world.
Now let me sketch the more general picture. For me, reductionism is the primary mistake to avoid. The language(s) of professional psychology/psychoanalysis and the language(s) of contemporary religion-spirituality cannot be reduced to each other. They flow from two different—if not radically dissimilar—forms of life and of experience. One should never completely replace one with the other, nor should one suggest that one of them is the “real meaning” of the other. These two sets of languages can certainly be interdependent-as they are in my own life-but they need not be. What I have been strongly suggesting is that it is best for both these sets of languages if their “native speakers” have a tolerance for the ambiguity that