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This paper further develops two earlier papers (Gerhardt, 2009a, 2009b) that addressed envy as part of an envy complex. The present paper explores two different but interrelated types of envy: (a) libidinal envy and (b) destructive envy. The description of libidinal envy draws upon Freud’s (1917) theory of melancholia as an unprocessed identificatory response to a lost object, as well as Benjamin’s (1995) ideas about the early need to be/feel like an ideal other. A discussion of the intersubjective matrix of envy (Benjamin, 1988, 1995) follows. The distinction between libidinal and destructive envy is based on Rosenfeld’s (1987) distinction between libidinal and destructive narcissism. Because envy is claimed to be universal (Hill & Buss, 2008; Schoeck, 1966), I discuss Klein’s assertion that envy has a biological basis from the perspective of its evolutionary value. A clinical vignette is included to illustrate the different types of envy.