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Both philosophy and psychoanalysis are currently full of discussion and excitement, under the rubric of cognitive science and neuroscience, about the possibility of eliminating the troublesome old concept of mind, with its tendencies to dualism. Current psychoanalytic writing is filled with talk about the brain and, under the name of neuropsychoanalysis, hopes to show that Freud's early project to interpret all psychological phenomena in terms of brain location failed only because the science of his time lacked the tools and the complexity he needed to complete the project. Late-20th-century postmodernism, especially beloved for its relativistic refusal of psychoanalytic claims to know, has remained the predominant antidote to neuropsychoanalytic reductionism. Perspectival realism—a fallibilistic, process, and systems view—shares these virtues without the relativistic, and ultimately solipsistic, commitments.