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Donna Orange (2003), in her article “Antidotes and Alternatives: Perspectival Realism and the New Reductionisms,” takes neurobiology to task for the sin of “reductionism,” a putatively pernicious process in which the complex exploration and understanding of meaning is supposedly reduced—and thereby diminished—by the neurobiological explication of its organic substrate. Although reductionism, in any form, is not generally a useful approach when consistently applied, Orange's implication that neurobiology is a priori reductionistic and her suggestion that most neurobiologists have as their primary goal the reduction of mind into matter simply are not true. Though neurobiology operates from an empirical stance, it, like any science, ultimately seeks greater understanding, and therefore there is no reason why it cannot work in conjunction with psychoanalysis. Moreover, barring the gates of psychoanalysis to other fields of thought is not done without some measure of peril.