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In 1989, a Californian jury was asked to deliberate on the case of a man accused of the rape and murder of an 8-year-old girl more than twenty years before. The prosecution had as its central witness the accused man's daughter, who alleged she had been present when this crime was committed. However, her memory for the event had apparently emerged for the first time during psychotherapeutic treatment two decades later. The stage was set for a legal battle, with shots fired by the opposing expert witnesses on the reliability of this memory. Whether it was ‘false memory’ or ‘recovered memory’ was the question set to decide the fate of the accused.
The Franklin/Lipsker case is, perhaps, the extreme end of this controversy, when debate becomes war. And yet, even through the smoke of battle, one may begin to glimpse the complex issues this case rests upon. What is truth? Is there a need to distinguish between legal, narrative, historical and scientific truths? How do expert witnesses bring to this legal battle such polarised and conflicting views on the nature of trauma and memory?
Gillian, a university student, consults a clinical psychologist about her problems of low self-esteem, feelings of vulnerability and uncertain sense of identity. In the course of taking a wide-ranging history, the psychologist enquires whether Gillian had suffered any unwanted sexual experiences as a child. Gillian replies ‘No’, but suddenly feels disorientated and unreal. On leaving the consultation she feels confused and has difficulty in thinking. She develops a headache. Later that evening she experiences suddenly an apparent memory of her grandfather sexually abusing her. She feels very anxious and vomits.