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Psychoanalysis has understood silence either as a defence, a symptom or as a necessary punctuation, but it is more intensely a part of language than these explanations would suggest. This paper aims to show that philosophy may supply a more adequate understanding of silence in clinical practice than has hitherto been possible. Without philosophy, psychoanalysis can given no very coherent account of silence. Contemporary attempts in psychotherapy to reinstate a value to silence have misunderstood it and imbued it with quasi mystical qualities.
By putting silence back within the orbit of language this paper avoids the categorical mistakes in our understanding of this phenomenon, which are common in the literature. Far from being an impediment to psychotherapy, silence has a significance and value which make it an essential ally of speech in the therapeutic process. This has particular implications in a therapeutic community, where there is the possibility to develop quiet areas in the unit which can form part of the treatment environment and serve to provoke a reparative introspection.