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During the past decade earnest attempts have been made both by psychologists and historians to clear up by the use of newer psychology many of the mooted points in historical interpretation of great men and their times. In the absence of biographical records embracing many of the intimate details required for such analysis, data from various original sources have been requisitioned to help out so far as possible. In dealing with ancient times, the paucity of facts greatly hampers any effort to arrive at a conclusion on any particular event or the part actually played by an individual. To throw as much light on such studies as possible, the psychoanalytical method has been found useful and has been sanctioned by such competent authorities as Prof. James Harvey Robinson, Prof. Harry Elmer Barnes, Prof. Preserved Smith and others. Encouraged by the opinions of such historians I have essayed no less a task than to interpret what we may aptly term the “wild goose chase” made by Alexander the Great after the defeat of the Persians, and to show how his mental attitude at that time precluded his undertaking the task obviously next before him: that of properly consolidating the vast empire he had won, an empire that included almost all of the then known world. It seems a strange lack of foresight on the part of so gifted a general and statesman that Alexander did not immediately set about to establish a strong empire after the decisive defeat of his enemies; but he made no consistent effort to accomplish such a purpose. Instead, he spent his time apparently in aimless pursuit of an unobvious goal. So peculiar was his attitude that it makes one seriously doubt the sanity of this great genius at that period. Many superficial motives have been put forward to account for his conduct, but none sufficiently explain his actions.