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There have been surprisingly few attempts to reformulate the main tenets of psychoanalysis in operational language although many writers, including the present author (7, 8, 9), have said that this can be done. Several theorists, such as Brown and Farber (4), Frenkel-Brunswik (19), Reid (41), Seeman (47), and Skinner (49), have attempted to translate a few psychoanalytic or psychodynamically oriented concepts into more operational terms, but a systematic reformulation of a good many of the Freudian principles does not seem to have been attempted as yet. Other theorists, such as Sullivan (51), have actually reworded much of the Freudian hypotheses in more precise terminology; but they have not been systematic either in their operationism or their inclusion of Freudian constructs; and they have often been more concerned with criticizing and modifying than with restating orthodox psychoanalytic concepts.
If psychoanalytic (or any other psychological) theory is to be reformulated in operational terms, the question must immediately arise: What is meant by operational? As originally presented by Bridgman (3), operationism seemed to be a relatively clear-cut method of research. But much ensuing comment and discussion have shown that, especially as it relates to psychological theory, it presents many serious problems (2, 12, 17, 25, 28, 31, 34, 39). Before we attempt to restate some of the basic principles of psychoanalysis in “operational” terms, therefore, it is best to define some of the main elements in a, modified or revisionist operationism that today will philosophically and scientifically stand up.
To be operationally meaningful, a statement must be confirmable at least in principle: that is to say, a scientific theory must be tied to observables at some point. It may be part of a whole network of other statements or theories; but eventually, somewhere along the line, it must be related to observables (1, 15, 16, 32).
Strict operationism, as origina