On the Utility of Spite

Within the past two decades a body of literature on the psychology of affects has begun to accumulate. Prominent spokesmen for the development of a theory of affects are Novey12,13 and Ostow,14 both of whom recognize that the clinician's obligation to focus on affect crises tends to divert his attention from the“natural functioning of affect as an integral part of the organism.” Novey has stated that a careful study of areas of clinical consensus relevant to the nature and function of affects is particularly warranted, since

prior attempts to construct a useful affect theory have been made with the primary goal of integrating it into our previously established metapsychological framework. This has required us to force affect theory into an already established mold with some violence, on occasion, to our practical need (p. 94). 12

With increased theoretical impetus in this area15 several studies of specific affects have appeared, such as Lewin10 on elation, Greenson8 on boredom, Greenacre7 on awe, myself, with J. Shor,2 on horror, De Sausseure6 on pleasure, J. Alexander1 on bitterness, Kesten9 on spite, and a contribution by Searles16 entitled “Scorn, Disillusionment, and Adoration in the Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia,” to which I shall later make reference.

This paper will be devoted to a discussion of the dynamics of spite, an affect which occupies a central role in the psychological processes of many borderline and psychotic patients. Very little attention has been accorded spite in psychoanalytic literature. References