III

In Information, Systems, and Psychoanalysis2 Emanuel Peterfreund coupled a forceful and closely reasoned critique of metapsychology with the recommendation that psychoanalysts should abandon it and adopt the information model instead. He argued cogently that the information model had many advantages. It was admirably suited to represent the complexities of clinical phenomena; it might enable psychoanalysis to develop into a general psychology; it could further a rapprochement between psychoanalysis and neurophysiology; and it might facilitate the interaction of psychoanalysis with other disciplines.

Peterfreund is deeply concerned about the future of psychoanalysis; his observations are trenchant and each of the matters he raises deserves careful attention. There is, however, another issue that perhaps deserves priority: is it absolutely necessary for a psychoanalyst to give up metapsychology before he can take an interest in the information model? Is there a contradiction in the simultaneous use of these instruments? If not, then Peterfreund may have done himself a disservice by linking his insistence that metapsychology be relinquished with his advocacy of the new model.

If the application of standards that ordinarily distinguish scientific instruments determines that clinical theory is the only theory of psychoanalysis, then metapsychology can be seen to be a model which serves to illustrate it. The information model has always been regarded as just that, a model. Consequently, since theories compete but models do not, there is no reason why these representations should not coexist. Further, if it is true that some persons naturally prefer to work with representations, then the information model may appeal precisely to those who heretofore have felt comfortable with metapsychology.

The positive aim of Peterfreund's book was to interest psychoanalysts in the possibilities offered by the new model. This aim might well be furthered by a demonstration that its use does