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For why is it said, Amicus alter ipse,
But that true friends should be two in body, but one in mind,
Though it seem, yet, in good faith, when I am alone
I forget I am Pithias, methink I am Damon.
This quote represents the embodiment in dramatic form of the classical theories of friendship, most notably: “One soul in two bodies” (Aristotle); “a second self” (Cicero); and “another I” (Zeno). The ancients' emphasis on friendship as a unity of selves underscores the mirrored similarities between the two friends.
The double or twinship concept in narcissism was well-known to the ancients. Aristophanes in the Symposium tells the delightful story about the way in which humans were originally constructed double, with four legs, four arms, and such. As a punishment for their sins, Zeus divided them perpendicularly, the males into two parts, the females into two parts. At the same time, Zeus gave each the desire to find the other half and restore the original unity.
In narcissistic friendship dyads, each friend finds his lost self in the other. Forever misunderstood, each perceives the other as one who understands and accepts him. A narcissistic alliance can then be established to fortify the pair against a hostile, unattuned world.
The ancients' unity of selves, “two in one” concept of friendship finds contemporary expression in Kohut's (Kohut, 1971, 1977; Kohut & Wolf, 1978) selfobject construct. This paper will explore the vicissitudes of the narcissistic friendship dyad, with particular emphasis given to three issues:
the role of the friend as a significant extrafamilial selfobject in the
strengthening of the grandiose self and the emergence of the ego ideal