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All our provisional ideas in psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic substructure.
No one is fitted to begin the materialistic study of the brain unless he has a good knowledge of psychology.
As a discipline, neuropsychology has traditionally been associated with cognitive psychology, on the one hand, and with clinical neurology on the other. As such, while substantial progress has been made toward the understanding of the cerebral substrates of language, memory, spatial perception, and other aspects of active, conscious cognition, relatively less attention has been devoted to such important dynamic processes as feelings, drives, passions, and symbolization. In part, this reflects the difficulty in operationally translating many of these constructs into levels of investigation appropriate to the accepted constraints of empirical research. Nevertheless, a number of recent writers have tried to use data derived from neuropsychological research to develop theoretical models of consciousness. Frequently, these models have been based on broad principles of human cerebral hemispheric asymmetry.
Attempts to localize psychological functions in various brain regions is, of course, not new, having a tradition in modern scientific neurology which dates back to the Vienna School of Brucke, Meynert, and Exner (Amacher, 1965). This was the day of Broca (1865) and Wernicke (1874) with their studies of the precise localization of language