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The 19th century saw the rise of the so-called “Human Sciences”—Geisteswissenschaften” as the Germans called them—Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology, et cetera. But were they really scientific? Compared to the socalled “Natural Sciences” the results of the Human Sciences seemed meagre, fractured, uncertain, and controversial. Two opinions appeared by way of response to the backwardness of the Human Sciences. The first suggested that we only improve our scientific understanding of human beings by perservering with the methods of the Natural Sciences. The second held that methods used for studying human beings must be sui generis, distinctly fashioned for the special kind of creature which we are. Among the advocates of the first opinion we find Freud himself. As a physician Freud always viewed himself as concerned with the causes of diseases and their symptoms. The second group includes such cultural interpreters as Max Weber and Wilhelm Dilthey who espoused the use of Verstehen—empathetic understanding—as a special mode of explaining human thought and action.
Controversies about the alleged scientific status of our understanding of human beings are still with us this late into the 20th century, and they are at the heart of Adolf Grünbaum's concern in his The Foundations of Psychoanalysis. He wants to know if the main views of Freudian Psychoanalytic theory are scientific, and, in brief, he concludes that they are not. Because of this hard line, Grübaum's work has achieved a certain notoriety through articles in newspapers and magazines. No one interested in psychoanalytic theory can afford to ignore his challenges. He is fully aware that many psychoanalysts are non-Freudian or nonorthodox, but maintains that even these have views close enough to Freud's to merit his criticism.
Let it be noted that this book is written in a deplorable manner, with an introductory chapter which does not introduce, but rather deals with substantive subject matter. It is repetitious with