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The psychologist-historian interested in the advance of science and its application is for obvious reasons often moved to examine failures in the course of a scholar's career; errors and faults are more effective in stimulating the quest for motives and causes than the successful completion of a project. Sometimes, however, psychologist-historians' assessments of what constitutes “failure,” particularly when based on “common-sense” judgments, may lack objectivity. Recently, some investigators have focused on the question of why Freud abandoned the seduction theory. Since they deny that he did so because the theory was wrong, they have groped for personal motives. They have made it appear as though Freud held a great truth in his hands but let it slip away for subjective, reprehensible reasons. Almost all such psychologist-historians did not consult relevant documents in order to test their hunches but relied mainly on common sense.1
Recourse to common-sense judgments derives from the desire to save time and thought. They are necessary in most situations for survival and at the same time a frequent cause of derailments. It is a sign of wisdom to know when common sense can be relied on and when it invites disaster. Fitting into traditional views, the common-sense judgment invites approval and agreement. Millions of people have idled away hours on the beach, but only Einstein wondered about the conspicuously different physical properties of dry, moist, and wet sand. To everyone else the differences were a matter of common sense.