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Epistemological issues have occupied a peculiar place in psychoanalytic thought. Two antithetical traditions can be identified. On the one hand, there is the mainstream view that matters pertaining to the philosophy of science are “too ecumenical and lofty for our parochial craft” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 34); on the other hand, there have been some analysts and interested others who have subjected these matters to ongoing scrutiny and exploration.
In the latter tradition, attention recently has focused on reconceptualizing traditional ideas about boundaries and related issues-that is, on how one could rethink the commonsense views concerning me/not me distinctions, how one could develop a different approach to what has been called “the inside-outside problem.” These are basic issues and presuppositions that structure our beliefs about the nature of the conscious subject, the status of that subject's “outside” world, and the ways in which the subject “represents” that world to self or consciousness. While common sense would have us believe that these are matters that have long been settled and understood, in fact the history of philosophical thought could be written in terms of different positions taken with respect to these matters, and they remain controversial and contested to the present time (Armour & Bartlett, 1980; Loy, 1988; Danto, 1989).
Thus, for analysts to be interested in significantly reconceptualizing me/not me distinctions is tantamount to their being interested in reconceptualizing entire traditional frameworks-meaning primarily those that belong to the Cartesian tradition.
Such attempts within psychoanalysis are part of a larger movement: “Most contemporary philosophers have been in revolt against the Cartesian framework” (Bernstein, 1971, p. 5); “The notion of