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The need to provide a succinct title for my article has made the result appear to be a manifestation of megalomania. It would have been much more appropriate, though less elegant, to entitle it Fragments of Some Preliminary Considerations on a Few Aspects of Certain Questions that Are Relevant to a Reflection on the Problem of the Construction of the World in Psychosis, Notably with Reference to the Work of Piera Aulagnier, all the more so as a good part of what I shall have to say will — in an attitude I always shared with Piera — be situated in the realm of the interrogatory.
I am going to begin this interrogation upstream. How do we know that psychosis is a psychical phenomenon — names can be deceiving — and not, for example, an organic one? Why would it be situated in the field of psychoanalysis at all? We may justify the first interrogatory statement in light of the age-old controversy surrounding the relations between body and soul, a controversy that has returned in force the past few years (cf. psychotropic substances, neurosciences, and so on). The second is also justified if one recalls that Freud did not doubt the psychical character of psychosis but deemed psychotics unanalyzable.
Why would psychosis not be, instead, like epilepsy or Alzheimer's disease? It is an inadequate answer to state that, in these latter cases, one notices alterations in the nervous tissue not found in psychosis. This answer is inadequate, first, because the objection is quite foreseeable: tissue lesions (or the molecule or gene, or the