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I want to express my appreciation to Dr. Brenner for coming to this meeting, and for preparing comments on the paper. I will respond to each of his points in turn.
Regarding the issue of anxiety which is present right from the start, I acknowledged on page 494 of the paper that there is insufficient evidence for anxiety at birth. Schur, in agreement with Freud, saw birth instead as the prototype of anxiety, with its massive sensory stimulation presumed to be overwhelming and incapable of being mastered. So there is no disagreement on this point.
There appears to be a difference, however, in how we conceptualize early distress. Brenner's decision is to limit the designation of early infant negative affects to an undifferentiated intense unpleasure, reserving the term anxiety for later functioning. My preference, following Freud and Schur, is to assume that early distress or intense unpleasure reflects a homeostatic disequilibrium that constitutes a danger which the human organism, like other species, is biologically endowed to process, even before the infant is able to appreciate the meaning of danger per se. This organismic distress is understood as an anxiety precursor, and when the distress is extreme, it is seen to lead to a predisposition to excessive later anxiety. Since Brenner holds that the early unpleasure is replaced by anxiety and depressive affect, it is unclear whether there is a consequential disagreement here. My emphasis, following Freud and Schur, is on genetic continuity. Brenner's formulation of the early unpleasure is less clear on this connection.
Regarding Brenner's assertion that present danger is an oxymoron, and potential danger a tautology: Brenner has assumed that anxiety cannot occur without anticipation. Danger for Brenner is limited to future danger. Does his view rule out the unexpected