Chapter 2 The Psychoanalyst's Selfobject Needs and the Effect of Their Frustration on the Treatment: A New View of Countertransference

We are aware of the multiple and complex definitions and conceptualizations of “countertransference” in the literature (see especially definitions and references in Rycroft, 1972; Moore and Fine, 1990) and we will not review them here. Historically, psychoanalysts have variously held two contradictory views on countertransference. One view is that it constitutes feelings on the part of the analyst that may interfere with the patient's therapy. The other is that it may be a valuable asset in the treatment process. Both these views of countertransference parallel, to a large extent, analysts' views of transference—that it may be an interference, a resistance, to the analysis and that it may serve as a major vehicle for the analytic process. Freud (1910) identified countertransference as an impediment to the effective treatment of the patient. This view persisted, for the most part, until 1950, when Heimann (1950) proferred a new definition and a novel perspective on countertransference. She regarded countertransference as comprising all the analyst's feelings