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The discussion of Kindler's challenging clinical material continues the polylogue, begun in October 1996 at the International Self Psychology Conference in Washington, among proponents of selfobject theory, motivational systems theory, and intersubjectivity theory. At the conference in 1996, I voiced my opinion that both intersubjectivity theory and motivational systems theory exist at a higher level of generality and inclusiveness than does selfobject theory, by virtue, in part, of the multidimensional nature of the former and the unidimensional quality of the latter. Intersubjectivity theory pictures personal experience as fluid, multidimensional, and exquisitely context-sensitive, with multiple dimensions of experience oscillating between foreground and background, between figure and ground, within an ongoing intersubjective system. Selfobject theory, by contrast, having originated in the study and treatment of narcissism and narcissistic pathology, primarily emphasizes the narcissistic or selfobject dimension of experience—its establishment, disruption, and repair.
As an illustration of the clinical consequences of a multidimensional versus a unidimensional theoretical perspective, consider the following quotation from Working Intersubjectively (Orange, Atwood, and Stolorow, 1997),