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Despite the grievous injuries it has sustained, many personally inflicted by Heinz Kohut, oedipal theory is alive, if not well, within self psychology. By questioning the preeminence of the Oedipus complex in normal development and demonstrating that inadequate selfobject relations, rather than unresolved oedipal conflicts, form the innermost core of psychopathology, Kohut (1959, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1984) boldly loosened the mainstays of Freudian theory. Yet, in his last writings, Kohut (1981, 1984) affirmed “the near ubiquity of the Oedipus complex” and retained his belief in the existence of an oedipal stage of development. His evident ambivalence about being perceived as “the Pied Piper who leads the young away from the solid ground of the object-libidinal aspects of the Oedipus complex” (Kohut, 1972, p. 622) appears to have exerted a cautionary effect on his followers. Indeed, most references to oedipal concepts in the self psychological literature since Kohut's death have echoed or elaborated upon his views (e.g., P. Ornstein, 1980; A. Ornstein, 1983; Lichtenberg, 1983, Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage, 1992 Terman, 1985; Goldberg, 1988, 1995).
Outside the ranks of self psychologists, proponents of widely varying approaches have found fault with every conceivable aspect of oedipal theory (Horney, 1924, 1926, 1939; Adler, 1927; Schafer, 1968; Gilligan, 1982; Stiver, 1991; Chodorow, 1992 are notable examples),