The term “mental representation” (of objects, the self, etc.) is often used in psychoanalytic papers to define the crucial point of the development of the psychic structure, around which the economic and dynamic activity rotates. As all authors do not use this term in the same way I find that some confusion ensues. I would therefore like to put forward some reflections on the theme following two lines of approach. In the first approach, I shall examine the clinical use of the term, a topic I shall deal with only briefly as it would include almost if not all literature. Along the second route I shall examine at greater length some papers which specifically deal with the subject.

For the first time with On Aphasias (Zur Aufassung der Aphasien, 1891) Freud used “Ding-Sachvorstellung” (I propose: “thing-presentation”) (1) to define functional organisations concomitant with mere mental