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As I tried to show in the first part of this paper (Pöstényi, 1979), there exist at present two types of theories on “borderline” and/or “narcissistic’1) disorders. It is obvious that the analyst' theoretical preferences will be mirrored in his clinical attitude and his technique. It is equally obvious that the theoretical preferences are themselves consequences of a variety of factors; among those to which I drew attention were the analyst' ontological and other philosophical assumptions, which were not necessarily formulated. On the contrary, it can be shown that, for the most part, it is only possible to infer them from the theory presented or from the corresponding technical recommendations. It would possibly be more correct to speak of an unconscious commitment to some ontological and other premises than of assumptions (Lesche, 1978).
In this part of the paper I would like to concentrate upon the effect of unconscious countertransference factors on the theoretical and technical preferences of analysts.
We have seen (Pöstényi, 1979) that there are two different types of views on the nature of the analytic treatment, (at least when applied to the above-mentioned diagnostic category). According to some analysts, the distinctive and essential feature of analysis is interpretation of the resistance