The Position of Metapsychology in the Formation of Psychoanalytic Knowledge and the Concept of “I” (Ego)

In recent years, the capacity of classical theory to give an adequate presentation of the subjective experiential world and intentionality of man has been questioned in psychoanalytical discussions. Critique has been specifically directed at Freud's metapsychology which has been considered experientially alienating, and constructed according to the ideals of “natural science” that are considered inappropriate to the humanities. Critique has been expressed not only from the clinico-practical but also from the scientific-theoretical points of view. As examples one could mention Heinz Kohut's (1977) self-psychology or Roy Schafer's (1976) hermeneutic re-interpretation of psychoanalysis.

It is, of course, no coincidence that questions of the essence of I, self, ego and the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge have simultaneously become problematic. If Freud's metapsychology is seen as a “naturalistic” theory explaining action from the outside, it is clear that it cannot be used in understanding man as the subject, the doer of his own acts, in other words, as the producer of his own I, a being determined by itself, and therefore, it becomes necessary to search for new concepts and methods of knowledge formation through which this subjectivity can be approached. At the same time, the very first theoretical objective Freud prescribed for psychoanalysis, the metapsychologic presentation of any given psychologic phenomenon to be studied would be found not only totally unnecessary for psychoanalytic practice but also misleading because what is determined by itself would have to be described as determined from the outside.