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As an answer to Lindell, who questions what new views my theory brings to drive theory, I wish to add these comments.
The viewpoints in my theories start from the moment where the self and the object (let it be objectal or a satisfaction bringing object) become represented, or where this event is prevented from occurring. The relationship between André Green and me lies not in seeking the limitations of Green, as Lindell claims. Rather, there is a difference between the thinking of Green and the theorizing of my own. My theory as well as the concepts of mine are energetic and therefore absolutely drive theoretical. My addition to the drive theory brings new views in the understanding of traumatized states. These can be seen in my thoughts of primary repression and in the shaping of a view of the birth of the unconscious. There, I think, one opens up a possibility to get in touch with the borderline between the psychoanalytically definitional hallucination and the somatically functional neurophysiology. Naturally, our viewpoint must be from the mental side of this border. In order to be able to approach psychosomatic problems, we need these new views. That is why I think my findings here are of value. All the questions I have approached through the technique of free association are therefore in constant touch with the birth of the symbolization process.