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We Return once more to the problem of action. In action the ego uses both somatic and mental apparatuses. “Mental apparatus” is a particularly fitting description of the preconscious automatisms (and not only of those which pertain to action); however, since it implies structure and formedness, as all concepts of apparatuses do, it is hardly applicable to what is occasionally termed the automatic character of the id. Bleuler (1920), when he coined the term “occasional apparatus” to explain the process of “abreaction,” had something analogous in mind; but we cannot dwell here on this special use of the concept. Schilder (1928) also uses the concept of apparatus frequently, and maintains that “function is facilitated by the very fact that the organism is a structure.” Actions, therefore, always imply intentions, acts of will, motives, etc. on the one hand, and (mental and physical) apparatuses on the other. Thus far investigators have paid little attention to the role of these apparatuses in the possibility, direction, success, and development of action. However, if we take the conflict-free ego sphere into consideration and if we want to develop a general psychology of action, the study of these apparatuses becomes imperative, because otherwise all our