Introduction

Psychoanalytic theory, like that of any branch of science, is in constant need of re-examination. Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein have stated this need as follows:

Concern with clarification of terms is unpopular among psychoanalysts and rare in psychoanalytic writing. This is partly due to Freud's example. Semantics could hardly be the concern of the great explorer, and some inconsistency in the usage of words may well be considered the prerogative of genius. It is a different matter when a generation or two of scientists assume a similar prerogative…. Since scientific communication is impaired by ambiguity of meaning, the need for clarification has become urgent [1946, pp. 27, 28].

The clarification of theoretical concepts is never—or at least should never be—a pure exercise in semantics. It should on the one hand strive to arrive at formulations which make for progress in theory, and on the other contribute directly or indirectly to a better application of theory—in our science, the teaching and practice of psychoanalysis.

An added goal of clarifying our theoretical concepts may also be to bridge conceptual gaps and eliminate misunderstandings between psychoanalysis and other branches of psychology and the behavioral sciences.

Whenever we attempt to reconsider some of our more basic theoretical concepts, we run up against several obstacles.