On: The Comments of Erik Gann

Dear Editors,

I agree with Erik Gann's criticism that perhaps my characterization of Freud's view at the end of the paper as ‘Hobbesian’ is a shorthand which does not do justice to the complexity of Freud's view. Freud indeed moved ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ whereas Hobbes did not. Still, Freud seemed also to have moved beyond his own conception of Ego Drives (which could have developed, and eventually did at Hartman's hands, into a theory which could see object relations as primary), finally coming to the position which makes them solely derivative of Drive discharge (erotic or aggressive). Even if we accept that there is no objectless drive, in the original formulation of drive theory the drive strives for discharge, and the object is the means, hence attachment to the object is still derivative. To the extent that one agrees that this is the case, then it would be inaccurate to describe Freud's view as relational according to the criterion my paper adopted from Greenberg and Mitchell — the question of whether one thinks of object relations as primary or derivative.

Freud's view then, even when extended beyond the pleasure principle, still sees all motivation as private self-interest in the narrow sense. It does elaborate Hobbes's view, but it does not challenge its basic assumption of egotism. And for this reason it does not challenge the whole framework of moral and political philosophy based on Hobbesian psychology. To this day, liberal individualism still assumes we are motivated by narrow self-interest alone, and therefore sees the basic question of moral and political philosophy in this way: ‘How can we arrange society (as well as families) so that self-interested monads would be able to get along together?’ But if getting along with others — attachments — is a primary motivation in itself, then the way to a different moral view opens up, and a serious challenge is posed to our conception of liberty as individual autonomy.

My point in bringing Hobbes into