You do not currently have permission to view the full text for this document. Please sign in to an account with an active subscription or contact support.
In psychoanalysis the genetic approach to mental phenomena has proved its intrinsic value for the understanding of the human mind. For the explanation of adult behavior, normal as well as pathological, the tracing back to its origins in early childhood is a necessary procedure. However, the genetic approach is only part of the picture. Without taking into account the maturational processes, including the development of the different functions, the structuralization and the differentiation of the mind, the influence of the environment and the inner and outer conflicts which give rise to reactive and defensive processes, the explanation remains one-sided and incomplete.
I am aware of the fact that these statements are self-evident and generally accepted. The reason I mention them here lies in the fact that though they are common knowledge, they nevertheless are often neglected. I am referring to those authors who do not clearly distinguish between genetic determinants (to borrow a term of Hartmann's) and developmental end products of mental processes, especially in connection with the structuralization into id, ego, and superego with their different functions. This lack of distinction may lead to oversimplifications in two opposite directions. On the one hand, functions and activities of an adult's ego organization are sometimes described as if they were merely a defense against "oral," or "anal," or "phallic" tendencies, which may be genetic determinants, but certainly do not cover the whole picture. This lack of a clear distinction between function and genesis is repeatedly stressed and criticized by Hartmann (1955), by Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962), etc. On the other hand, processes occurring in infancy are sometimes described in terms of an adult's (pathological) behavior