The article offers a critique of the category of the individual that psychoanalysis has often taken at face value. At issue is the conception of the moral individual as an isolated, coherent, autonomous, singular being, constituted as such prior to any contact with others, and characterized by the interiority and intimacy of an ego. Although psychoanalysis is a privileged ally in the deconstruction of a certain conception of subjectivity, it has nonetheless contributed in another way to establishing the modern conception of individuality. The present contribution shows that philosophy can identify this debatable presupposition of classical psychoanalysis that the individual is an isolated being, a presupposition that is linked to a certain discourse on the moral autonomy of subjects, and goes on to explain that, despite the largely imaginary nature of the enclosure of subjectivity and its dimensions of intimacy and interiority, the suffering associated with excessive individuation is no less real and should be addressed by a clinical approach that is focused on the pathologies of individuality.